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BOOK REVIEWS 
Experience, Explanation and Faith: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion, by Anthony O'Hear. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, 
pp. 266, xiii. Paper, $10.95. 
THOMAS V. MORRIS, The University of Notre Dame. 
In an act of creative inference, Anthony O'Hear concludes from his study of 
religion that typical religious beliefs, such as belief in the existence of a God, 
"are not rationally acceptable." This is announced in his introduction to the book, 
along with a recommendation that "rational men should look beyond religion 
for the fulfillment of their spiritual needs." The hero of this book is the Buddha 
who, according to O'Hear, did just that. In the author's own words, which 
comprise the last sentence of the book: 
The beauty of the Buddha's spirituality is precisely that it is a spirituality 
without faith, without words, without explanation, and without religion. 
(251) 
This is not, however, a book on Buddhism, an exercise in comparative religion, 
or an essay on religion and spirituality. It is rather a fairly standard sort of treatise 
in the philosophy of religion, written in what has come to be known as the 
broadly analytic style. It is presented, by its subtitle, as an introduction to this 
field of philosophy. As such, it has some merits. It is fairly clearly written, it 
attempts an extended argument, linking its various chapters in service to a 
dominant organizing theme, and it touches on some important topics often neg-
lected in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of religion. I suspect how-
ever that although many philosophers concerned with religious problems will 
find some of O'Hear's arguments interesting to read, few will find the book 
suitable for classroom use. For its weaknesses as an introductory text are signif-
icant. 
The level of exposition is in some ways quite variable. Many sections of the 
book could be read with interest and understanding by any fairly intelligent and 
generally educated person. But the philosophical neophyte will hardly be able 
to retain his equilibrium through, for example, numerous mentions of S5 and 
Brouwershe systems sprinkled throughout O'Hear's convoluted discussion of the 
ontological argument. Further, although the general aim of the book is fairly 
clear, and most paragraphs in its exposition are lucid enough in their own right, 
the various stages in the overall argument are not sufficiently well marked to 
keep most introductory students from losing their way. This is especially prob-
lematic in a 112 page chapter entitled "Religious Explanations," which seems 
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to make up the core of the book. 
In addition, O'Hear seems to have invested a good deal more energy into his 
anti-religious rhetoric than into constructi!1g careful arguments to support his 
claims. His tone is often strident, his characterizations of religion and religious 
belief tendentious, and his strategy of argument surprising-such that his conclu-
sions are severely underdetermined by the argumentative tactics he employs. 
In chapter one, "Faith and Religious Life," o 'Hear sketches out some important 
ways in which religions function in the lives of their adherents, a topic to which 
he returns in the last chapter. Faith is presented as "an all-encompassing set of 
attitudes to human life and the world." And religions are depicted as typically 
providing a framework of beliefs which both explain important features of their 
world to believers, and endow their individual lives with meaning. Although the 
discussion here is brief, and is marred by a depreciating tone at times, it is good 
to see a philosopher giving at least some attention to these elements of religion 
most often discussed only by sociologists (such as, for example, Peter Berger) 
and professors of Religious Studies. 
Lest he be thought to be endorsing a Wittgensteinian view of religion as a 
"form of life" in which the activities and attitudes of believers are more central 
than their beliefs, and the functions of those beliefs more important than their 
truth-value, O'Hear devotes the bulk of this first chapter to a discussion and 
critique of Wittgenstein's characterizations of religion. The exposition of 
Wittgenstein is responsible, and the criticisms well taken, though somewhat 
standard. It is stressed that religions do make truth claims which can be understood 
as well as investigated by the uncommitted. 
After having established in chapter one the importance of particular beliefs, 
such as the belief that there is a God, in typical religions, O'Hear goes on in 
his second chapter to begin the cummulative argument which he thinks will show 
that standard theistic beliefs cannot withstand rational criticism (for this conclu-
sion, see 249). In chapter two, entitled "Religious Experience and Religious 
Knowledge," he essays to explore the common claim that central religious beliefs, 
such as belief in God, are justified rationally by their connection to certain sorts 
of experience which give rise to them. The focus of his examination is the often 
drawn parallel between religious experience and sense experience. As we all are 
justified in taking our sense experience to be for the most part a reliable mode, 
or set of modes, of information-access to an objective reality existing distinct 
from such experience, so, the argument goes, religious believers are justified in 
taking their theistic experiences to yield reliable access to an objective theistic 
reality--God. o 'Hear understands the parallel here to be one between explanatory 
schemes: As the hypothesis of reliability and the postulation of an objective 
physical reality is supposed to have explanatory power with respect to the shape 
of ordinary sense experience, so the hypothesis of reliability and postulation of 
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a God causally responsible for it is supposed to have explanatory power with 
respect to the shape ofreligious experience. His argument then is that the theistic 
explanatory scheme, unlike the external world scheme, does not satisfy numerous 
criteria for a good scientific explanatory theory, criteria such as generation of 
reliable predictions. 
It would be hard for any theist to resist the penetrating rejoinder of "If so, so 
what?" Why should religious beliefs satisfy criteria appropriate to hypotheses 
purporting to give a certain sort of explanation of the natural in terms of the 
natural? O'Hear's approach here is reminiscent of the attitude of Richard Taylor 
toward dualism in his little book Metaphysics, where he seems to suggest that 
I am justified in thinking I have a mind only if the postulation of such an entity 
in my case would have significant explanatory value for me, and explanatory 
value of the sort professionally sought after by chemists, physicists, and molecular 
biologists. I, for one, see no good reason to adopt this attitude. Typical metaphys-
ical beliefs just seem very different from typical hypotheses in the natural sciences. 
And even within the domain of metaphysics, there is a great deal of difference. 
For example, theists believe in a causally active individual with whom they may 
come in contact; no essentialist expects ever to be accosted by an haecceity. 
Thus the epistemic dynamics of theism and essentialism will be interestingly 
different from one another, and surely also essentially different from the dynamics 
of scientific hypotheses. 
Aside from such problems concerning the structure of O'Hear's argument, the 
main shortcoming of this second chapter is his failure to even consider any of 
the exciting recent work relevant to the connection between religious experience 
and religious belief being done by such philosophers as William Alston, Alvin 
Plantinga, Robert Oakes, Gary Gutting, and Nicholas Wolterstroff, among many 
others. It is safe to say that some of the main implications of this work in religious 
epistemology bear importantly on our assessment of the status of religious experi-
ence. And so a chapter on the topic ignores all of this work to its great detriment. 
In the third chapter, "Religion, Truth, and Morality," O'Hear considers the 
possibility that there is something about the human cognitive endeavor, or the 
moral enterprise, which requires a postulation or acknowledgement of theism as 
true. To examine the claim that in our search always to know and understand 
we are making assumptions which make sense only, or best, within a theistic 
framework, O'Hear canvasses some of the writings of Rahner, Lonergan, and 
Kolakowski. He overlooks important contemporary arguments to this effect by 
Keith Ward, Hugo Meynell, and George Schlesinger, which are all of significant 
interest. It should be no surprise that o 'Hear finds the few arguments he considers 
uncompelling. In the section on morality, the author presents a fairly standard, 
brief, and unoriginal discussion of the Euthyphro Dilemma. This involves a very 
superficial consideration of divine command theories of ethics. The chapter 
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suffers severely by being uninformed by the important relevant work of Quinn, 
Wierenga, Mavrodes, Adams, and others. It is not that I expect every introductory 
text to include a survey of recent literature. The point here and above is rather 
that even this level text will be lacking in value if its discussions do not take 
into consideration the best of what has been said on its topics. To conclude the 
chapter, O'Hear attempts to sketch out a naturalistic foundation for morality, 
basing it on facts about human psychology and the nature of shared projects. 
His conclusion is that neither knowledge nor morality points to God. 
Chapter four, "Religious Explanations," practically a treatise in itself, examines 
some of the best known arguments for the existence of God comprising traditional 
and contemporary natural theology. As if to stress the importance of demonstrative 
or probabilifying arguments to the rationality of theism, O'Hear begins the 
chapter by reviewing and rejecting the suggestion made by F. R. Tennant and 
others that it is acceptable for religion to rest on faith, since science just as much 
relies on fundamental faith in such assumptions as that, for instance, nature is 
uniform and induction is reliable. O'Hear attempts to impugn the analogy by 
insisting that science does not require anything like religious faith in uniformity 
and inductive procedures, a highly tentative and provisional"hope" in these things 
rather sufficing for successful scientific work. But of course this is a bit weak 
and hardly to the point. As a matter of fact, the expectations of the average 
working scientist that uniformity will hold and the induction will work are as 
strong as any of his other beliefs. And surely he is rational in this, regardless 
of whether that strength of conviction is strictly required by his science. The 
rationality of the ordinary convinced scientist does not, of course, render the 
provisional attitude of the sophisticate O'Hear apparently has in mind irrational. 
But neither does the presumed rationality of the tentative sophisticate reflect 
negatively on the average laboratory believer. And this is all a Tennant-style 
argument really needs. 
O'Hear then goes on to consider cosmological, teleological, and ontological 
arguments for the existence of God. One interesting feature of the discussion is 
that he begins by propounding a quite minimal thesis that rejection of these 
arguments by a person not already inclined to believe in God is not irrational 
and not without justification, maintains a correspondingly moderate tone 
throughout the actual examinations of the arguments, and yet later in his con-
cluding chapter, with no relevant intervening argument to bridge this gap, unveils 
his overall conclusion that theism cannot withstand rational scrutiny. 
In discussing the cosmological and teleological arguments, O'Hear addresses 
some quite interesting topics, but does not dig deeply enough to provide the sort 
of fresh insights which are needed at this stage in the discussion of theistic 
argumentation. One such topic is the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The author 
does not trouble to inquire into how a consistent theist will understand the 
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principle, and as a result does not give it the precise sort of formulation it needs. 
Nor is he very careful in assessing the modal status of the principle. He infers 
from the fact that it is not inconceivable that within this world there be brute 
facts to the conclusion that PSR is not a necessary truth. But first of all, as is 
nowadays quite well known, we must be careful not to confIate psychological 
questions of conceivability or imaginability with questions of broadly logical 
necessity and possibility. Further, I think it can be argued that although it is 
possible to have doubts about the truth-value of PSR (it can seem possible that 
it be true, possible that it be false), its modal status is such that it is necessarily 
true or necessarily false. For according to the version of PSR a traditional theist 
will hold, every contingent physical or natural event, fact, or state of affairs 
which occurs or obtains will be such that there is a reason why it occurs or 
obtains, a reason which involves either its direct dependence on God as its cause, 
or its dependence on some other free-willed agent as its cause, which in tum 
depends on God as a cause of its existence. The only sort of God on whom all 
explanations can thus ultimately depend, whose existence can be argumentatively 
displayed through a use ofPSR, will be a God with necessary existence, necessary 
omnipotence, and necessary omniscience. But then it is impossible that there 
exist anything independent of the will and causal activity of such a being. And 
only if something could exist independently of his will, the ultimate ground of 
the truth of PSR, could PSR be false. Thus, if there is a God, he necessarily 
exists and PSR is of necessity true. Although I shall not take the space to sketch 
it here, I think that it also can be argued that only if there is such a God is PSR 
true. If there is no such God, there necessarily is none, and so PSR is necessarily 
false. Either way, its modal status is one of necessity. 
Another idea O'Hear touches on but does not explore the way it needs exploring 
is one often relied upon by Swinburne-the idea of prior probabilities for theism 
and naturalism, and the notion that considerations of theoretical or ontological 
simplicity are somehow relevant to the assignment of such probabilities. There 
is a great deal of mystery and some controversy surrounding these ideas nowadays. 
O'Hear rejects Swinburne's positions, but without, unfortunately, giving much 
by way of argument for doing so. He chooses rather to rebuff Swinburne's claim 
that its simplicity endows theism with significant prior probability with little 
more than the remark that "Not all philosophers of science regard such simplicity 
as increasing prior probability" (115). But of course, as that notable Renaissance 
thinker Henrikus Cornelius Agrippa von Nettlesheim was wont to observe, "Phi-
losophers disagree about everything." It is neither very illuminating, nor a very 
great blow to Swinburne, to point out that some philosophers of science disagree 
with him. The complex issue of the bearing of simplicity on probability, or for 
that matter the bearing of probability at all, in such contexts still cries out for 
elucidation if real progress is to be made in our evaluations of Swinburne-style 
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arguments. 
In his assessment of one form of teleological argument, O'Hear resists what 
he considers the crucial assumption of the all-pervasive uniformity of order in 
the universe throughout all space and time by attempting to replace it with the 
ancient Epicurean hypothesis of the locality of order (not in my mind a real 
alternative at all). He ends by saying "All we have here are competing intuitions 
and no means of deciding between them," a modest claim indeed. However, the 
modesty is short-lived as O'Hear turns his attention to the ontological argument. 
He begins his commentary on this fascinating argument, or family of argu-
ments, by announcing that the very idea of an ontological argument "involves 
a negation of all thought and all intellectual discrimination" (143). According 
to O'Hear, the ideal of God's being necessary "has a Zen-like effect of mes-
merizing those who submit themselves to it," a remark which surely rivals some 
of the purple prose of which the late John Mackie was capable when being 
goaded by St. Anselm's discovery. After such an introduction, it is quite disap-
pointing to find O'Hear's actual discussion of the details of the argument some-
what convoluted and for the most part unoriginal. And, again, the discussion is 
adversely affected by failure to sort out issues of alethic modality from those of 
conceivability. 
One of the strangest features in the book comes to the surface predominently 
in this chapter. O'Hear seems to think that the only proper conclusion to an 
ontological or cosmological argument will involve the postulation of a being 
without determinate attributes, a God of "pure being." The connection of such 
a conception with these arguments, however, is nearly as big a mystery as the 
conception itself. While applauding O'Hear's rejection of severely aprophatic 
theology, I must wonder why in the world he thinks it is even relevant here. He 
appears to claim, moreover repeatedly, that what anyone who is attracted to the 
ontological argument is trying to express is the conviction that God's existence 
is very different from the existence of anything else, and that since the existence 
of everything else is the existence of a determinate reality characterized by 
numerous distinct attributes, the conviction being expressed is that God is an 
indeterminate ground of all determinate reality, himself without discrete proper-
ties and thus literally indescribable by any standard linguistic means. O'Hear 
rightly brands such a view as incoherent. But the inference by which he attributes 
it to proponents of ontological arguments could not be more patently fallacious. 
From the conviction that God's existence is in some important ways very different 
from that of any other reality (e.g. by being absolutely independent ontologically 
and unconditioned by any deeper ground of existence) it does not follow that it 
is different in every respect from the existence of other realities, which would 
of course be impossible. 
Likewise, O'Hear seems to think that the cosmological argument requires that 
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God be an indetenninate, property-less ground of all existence if he is to be a 
proper stopping-point of explanation, given the relentless press of PSR. The 
assumption operative here seems to be that any property instantiation requires 
explanation, and the consequent argument to be that if God had detenninate 
properties, they would require explanation, which could not itself in every case 
be provided by God. The theist, however, has a number of ways available to 
him for avoiding the obviously unacceptable conclusion O'Hear attributes to 
him. The best known involves a claim that only contingently, not necessarily, 
exemplified properties are such that their exemplification requires explanation. 
Those of God's properties which comprise his nature and so might be thought 
to be beyond explanation by his activity, such as his omnipotence, omniscience, 
and so forth, are not such that their exemplification requires further explanation, 
according to a properly fonnulated PSR; and those which do not comprise his 
nature can be explained by his causal activity. O'Hear does not consider any 
such possibilities, remaining content to ascribe to proponents of these theistic 
arguments a clearly absurd view instead. 
Chapter five, "Suffering and Evil," is perhaps the most interesting, and certainly 
the most surprising in the book. After considering both the logical and evidential 
fonns of the problem of evil and reviewing some standard theistic responses, 
O'Hear concludes from his own assessment of the challenge that "the argument 
against religion from evil and suffering fails" (221). Basically, O'Hear contends 
that the reality of suffering seems so intimately tied up with the development of 
a virtuous as well as a rational fonn of life in the world that it would be extremely 
hard for any critic of theism to establish with any rational force the claim that 
a world created by a God could not contain (or most likely would not contain) 
the sorts and amounts of suffering blighting our world. 
It may sound as if O'Hear just endores the well known Virtuous Response, 
or Soul-Making Theodicy here. But his reasoning is actually interestingly different 
from such views as standardly propounded by theists. The typical theist's claim 
is that it is morally justifiable for God to have created an environment in which 
beings capable of moral freedom can in response to hardship freely attain morally 
virtuous characters and spiritual qualities which are necessary conditions for 
partaking in the beatific communion with God which is eternal life, and is the 
goal for which they are created. O'Hear argues that the conception of heaven 
standardly offered as a description of the end-state in which soul-making properly 
culminates actually involves assumptions logically inconsistent with the genuine 
insights about the intimate connection between suffering and difficulty on the 
one hand and rational virtuous life on the other. The heavenly state of existence 
is usually characterized as one utterly devoid of sufferings, frustrations, or dif-
ficulties of any kind. O'Hear contends that the link between these negativities 
and the positive features of human life are such that no recognizably human, 
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rational existence would be possible in their absence. This is not an altogether 
new contention, having been suggested in one way or another by other philoso-
phers in recent years, but it is still novel and interesting enough when properly 
developed to merit further work. The challenge is for theists to display a concep-
tion of the ultimate human state of communion with God which is consonant 
with claims made in the context of the problem of evil. If God's justification in 
bringing about or allowing certain evils is that they are logically necessary 
conditions for certain important goods, and heaven lacks those evils, does it not 
just follow that heaven is devoid of those important goods? This is O'Hear's 
challenge. Most recent work on the after-life has centered around questions of 
the possibility of resurrection or disembodied existence. I think that at this 
juncture theists could move on to consider other problems concerning the after-
life, such as those raised by O'Hear, and by such other philosophers as, say, 
Bernard Williams. We would all benefit from the attempt to delineate models 
for after-life and to show in some detail what is wrong with the sort of objection 
exemplified by O'Hear's reasoning. 
In the sixth and final chapter of this book, "Religion and the Rational Man," 
there is an intimation of what may be the main reason O'Hear finds theistic 
belief rationally unacceptable. It is not so much that he finds theism lacking in 
the virtues of a good scientific hypothesis, or that he appraises standard theistic 
arguments as less than compelling, or even that he judges the overall traditional 
theistic vision of human life as aiming at a bliss full eternity to be problematic, 
but rather it seems that his negative assessment may turn crucially on what he 
considers to be the apparent inexplicability of the hidden-ness of God. If there 
is a God, O'Hear joins many others in asking, why does he not show himself 
more clearly? Why is this world of ours at best religiously ambiguous to the 
inquiring observer? Hick's well known response O'Hear finds completely unsatis-
factory, and by pressing the point draws our attention to one of the most remark-
able problems for religious belief-remarkable in that the degree to which it is 
treated in contemporary literature in the philosophy of religion seems to stand 
in an inverse relation to its commonality and importance as a religious problem. 
What I am referring to as the hidden-ness of God may be a problem for as 
many people, believers as well as searching unbelievers, as is the enormity of 
pain and suffering. In fact, the problem of evil can even be seen as indicating 
a way in which if there is a God, he is hidden. So what may be the most widely 
discussed problem in the philosophy of religion may be a version of what in its 
most general features may be one of the most neglected topics among philosophers 
working in the field since the writings of Pascal. The value of O'Hear's remarks, 
which are somewhat sketchy and truncated, lies primarily in the reminder they 
carry that this is a problem which requires much more direct philosophical 
attention than it has received. 
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After a lengthy exposition concerning what he considers the dogmatism and 
lack of critical attitude in traditional religion, O'Hear wraps up his discussion 
by saying "My thesis in this chapter has been that religion is essentially dogmatic, 
fetishistic, and authoritarian; that this aspect of religion is what religion derives 
its strength from" (249), by, as he has suggested, pandering to the emotional 
and psychological needs of people. And, not to miss a way of dismissing religion, 
he adds to his characterization of it as rationally indefensible the claim that in 
addition "religion (at least in any traditional form) cannot be a force for good 
at the present" (244), a claim which has in this book just as little argumentative 
support. 
Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. by Steven T. Katz. Oxford University 
Press, 1983. 
Reviewed by NELSON PIKE, University of California, Irvine. 
Professor Katz begins the "Editor's Introduction" to this text with a sketch of 
what he calls "the predominant scholarly view" concerning the relation between 
the mystic of a given culture and "the socio-historical, Philosophical-theological" 
environment provided by the culture in question. According to this view, the 
mystic is one who has something called "the mystical experience" and who then 
"soars above dogma and community, leaving the sober majority behind to its 
mechanical, if irrelevant, religious teachings and practices". The mystic's contact 
with the religious community of which he is a part comes only at the point where 
he " ... must descend from his height and then, caught up again in the fetters of 
tradition and history, space and time, he must express what is truly inexpressible 
in the inadequate symbols and syntax of his particular faith community". Given 
this "common image" (what Katz calls "the "regnant scholarly orthodoxy"), the 
question arises as to whether it may not be in error. And (Katz tell us) it is this 
possibility-the possibility that it may be fundamentally mistaken-that (in his 
words) "has brought the present symposium into being". Speaking ofthe relation 
between the mystic and cultural milieu in which the mystic exists, Katz identifies 
the issue to which the ten essays contained in this volume are (presumably) 
addressed as follows: 
The essays in this volume have been written in order to reconsider 
this relational issue afresh with the hope that a more adequate schemati-
zation of this dialectical encounter can be arrived at. This is to say, the 
present essays are attempts to reconsider, in various ways, the question: 
"What relation(s) does obtain between mystics and the religious com-
